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ABSTRACT A major contribution of anthropological work has been to challenge a unitary theory of the human. In
this American Anthropologist vital topics forum, a range of prominent anthropologists contribute to this challenge
and provide musings on the human. The essays in this forum reflect diversity and unity of anthropological thought
on human nature. Some note humans’ connection to other primates, and others emphasize our distinction from
ancestral patterns. Several reflect on cultural change, globally and locally, while others problematize what we might
mean by, and who we include in, a “human” nature. The perception of humans constructing and being constructed
by the world and the warning to be cognizant of our approaches to defining ourselves are central themes here. Our
goal is to initiate a discussion that might reshape, or at least influence, academic and public debates.
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INTRODUCTION
Agustı́n Fuentes Department of Anthropology, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556; afuentes@nd.edu
All studies of man, from history to linguistics and psychology, are
faced with the question of whether, in the last instance, we are
the product of all kinds of external factors, or if, in spite of our
differences, we have something we could call a common human
nature, by which we can recognize each other as human beings.
—Dutch philosopher Fons Edlers, opening the 1971 debate
between Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky on “Human
Nature”
In the current historical moment, broad swaths of the U.S.
public—as well as the U.S. academy—are engaging in heated
debate concerning what it means to be “human.” Many ask
what lies at the core of humanity. Is it the Hobbesian beast
prominent in current conservative discourse? The moral and
cooperative animal increasingly proposed by some psychol-
ogists and animal behaviorists? The suite of adaptations, re-
sponding to a mythical Environment of Evolutionary Adap-
tation, heralded by some evolutionary psychologists? The
products of social, political, economic, and historical con-
texts proposed by some culture theorists?
We could begin our discussion with the obvious point
that the answer to this question is “none of the above.” Since
its beginnings, one powerful contribution of anthropological
work has been to challenge any unitary theory of the human.
Yet another equally long-standing body of anthropological
work emphasizes overarching similitude, arguing that human
bodies, languages, and cultures cannot be ranked over each
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other. What can anthropological inquiry contribute to un-
derstandings of the human beyond these twin arguments of
human difference and human sameness? Where beyond the
frontier of the sameness–difference binary does “the human”
lie?
Of late, psychologists, historians, political scientists,
economists, and even philosophers have been in the public
eye speaking about these issues of the human; anthropo-
logical voices have been muted in comparison. I propose
we take this topic by the horns and advance a new public
debate about it. Anthropologists have largely rejected the
antiquated dichotomy of nature versus nurture in favor of
dynamic understandings of social, biological, and historical
complexities. Anthropologists can show that the line di-
viding the social and the physiological is arbitrary, that no
human action or morphological trait exists in a vacuum, and
that human history is the conjunctural and emergent prod-
uct of social, physiological, morphological, symbolic, and
historical interactivities.
In this American Anthropologist forum, I have invited a
range of prominent anthropologists to “think aloud” in regard
to these issues. I am particularly interested in anthropological
rethinkings of the human that move beyond either sameness
or difference as the intellectual “punchline.” What crucial
insights can anthropologists provide to debates over “the
human” beyond pointing to what we share, on the one hand,
or what distinguishes us, on the other hand? How might such
insights reshape academic and public debates over the human
itself?
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OFF HUMAN NATURE
Jonathan Marks Department of Anthropology, University
of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001;
jmarks@uncc.edu
We have evolved into biocultural ex-apes.
Pre-Darwinian scholars of the Enlightenment tried to
imagine a noncultural human condition, but we now know
that we have been coevolving simply with stone tools for
over 2.5 million years. Consequently, the quest to imagine
a human condition without culture is simply the tortured
dream of a hack philosophe. The fundamental contributions
of anthropology to discussions of human nature are twofold:
first, to situate such discourses within the broader intellectual
framework of theories of descent, classification, and the
cultural meanings of science; and second, to bound such
discourses by the reliable knowledge of human origins—
that is to say, by scientific rigor (Marks 2009).
One of the most extraordinary paradoxes of modern sci-
ence is the way in which a pre-Darwinian concept (deriving
the essential properties of the human beast) has been trans-
formed into a Darwinian litmus test: if you don’t believe
sufficiently in the idea of human nature, then you must be a
creationist (Konner 2002; Pinker 2003). But in an intellec-
tual arena where facts are notoriously difficult to come by,
one fact is certain: human nature is a politically contested
turf. Anyone who pronounces on it, while simultaneously
arguing that their pronouncements are disconnected from
society and politics, is not to be taken seriously.
To imagine that we are nothing but apes, and to find
human nature there (e.g., de Waal 2005; Wrangham and
Peterson 1996), actually constitutes a denial of evolution.
We evolved; get over it. In a classic midcentury synthe-
sis, George Gaylord Simpson explained the problem with
“nothing-butism”: “Such statements are not only untrue
but also vicious for they deliberately lead astray enquiry
as to what man really is and so distort our whole com-
prehension of ourselves” (1949:283). Evolution is the pro-
duction of difference and novelty, and you are not your
ancestors.
Apes were your ancestors, but the elision of identity with
ancestry is reductive and political. Is each of us constrained
by the abilities, achievements, gene pool, and history of our
ancestors—or do we have the capacity to be different from
them? That’s an interesting “biopolitical” question. After all,
the most consistent scientific invocation of human nature has
been to explore, or, rather, to construct, limits to human
social progress. Thus, by the end of World War I, a polarity
had emerged among evolutionary biologists. Science From
the Right believed that by rejecting Lamarckism (acquired
characteristics, or “soft” inheritance), we could now see that
we are all perpetually mired in our own germ-plasm, which
in turn sets rigid boundaries on the possibilities open to the
person, the race, or the species. In practice, this science has
invoked a post-Darwinian human “nature” largely to mount a
last-ditch defense of some form of hereditary aristocracy and
to oppose the doctrines of racial and sexual political equality
(Cohen 2007; Galton 1869; Gobineau 1915; Herrnstein and
Murray 1994).
Science from the Left, however, commonly sought non-
Mendelian mechanisms for transcending our bestial ancestry.
Even before the end of the 19th century, the first generation
of European anthropologists was studying the mutable and
adaptive qualities of human culture and human physical plas-
ticity; it was for good reason that E. B. Tylor (1871:453)
called anthropology “a reformer’s science.” Quakers, how-
ever, would prove to be less worthy of attention as interlocu-
tors than those quintessential chameleons and assimilators of
the Left—the Jews (Garrett 1961; Putnam 1961; Sarich and
Miele 2004; see also Lipphardt 2008; Schaffer 2007).
Thus, Paul Kammerer, who rose to fame (and later, in-
famy) on amphibian reproductive biology, drew biopolitical
conclusions that went radically beyond his data: “Cannot the
human race be taught to avoid acquired degenerate tenden-
cies? Cannot the law I have laid down be applied and guide
humanity to a higher level? I would suggest, first, that it be
used to eliminate race hatred” (Jones 1923; Gliboff 2006). A
noble thought, to be sure, but one that is more plainly rooted
in human social facts than in the mating habits of toads. We
should look to real anthropology, rather than to imaginary
biology, to understand what it means to be a cultural, as well
as a natural, being.
If, however, we mean by “human nature” what the first
generation of anthropologists called “the psychic unity of
mankind,” then it is possibly something real but method-
ologically daunting. It may well be true that “it is human
nature to think in binary oppositions,” but such a statement
certainly has more hermeneutic than biological value. Scien-
tifically minded anthropologists have to be most suspicious
of studies purporting to naturalize human social relations,
for they tend to be ideologically the strongest while episte-
mologically the weakest. For example, I don’t see how one
can talk sensibly about xenophobia as human nature without
confronting the constructed aspects of human groups. I also
don’t know what it means for evolution if 80 percent of
people surveyed, or societies visited, answer a question in a
particular way. Instead, the anthropologist in me focuses on
the other 20 percent and wonders whether they are to be
regarded as mutants or as apes.
WHAT IS A HUMAN BEING?
Tim Ingold Department of Anthropology, School of Social
Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, United
Kingdom; tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk
What is a human being? What does it mean to be human? To
the first question, we might answer: a species of nature, a
particular subdivision of the primate order. But we tend to
answer the second question differently. To be human, we
say, is to transcend the world of nature, to be more than a
mere organism. Thanks to this transcendence, humans can
look into the mirror of nature and know themselves for
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what they are. It is because of this duplicity in the mean-
ing of the human that psychologists persist in the search for
a universal architecture underwriting the capacities of the
human mind while attributing the evolution of these capaci-
ties to a theory—of variation under natural selection—that
only works because the individuals of a species are endlessly
variable. This is not a mistake that anatomists would make.
Every human being, for example, has a protuberance in the
centre of the face with two holes that allow the inhalation and
exhalation of air. We call it the nose. No two noses are alike:
they vary among individuals and among populations. Yet no
one conversant with modern biology would attribute these
variations to developmentally induced inflections of a uni-
versal nasal architecture, identically keyed in to all humans.
Did not Darwin finally refute the essentialist doctrine that
for every species there exists a preestablished, formal tem-
plate? Yet this is precisely the doctrine to which evolutionary
psychologists appeal in their search for human cognitive uni-
versals. They do so because it is an epistemological condition
for their science.
Nowadays, scientists assign all extant human beings not
just to one species but to one subspecies, Homo sapiens sapi-
ens, all other subspecies having become extinct. The accom-
panying rhetoric, however, reveals this to be no ordinary
subspecies. Doubly sapient, the first attribution of wisdom,
the outcome of a process of encephalization, marks it out
within the world of living things. But the second, far from
marking a further subdivision, is said to register a decisive
break from that world. In what many have taken to call-
ing the “human revolution,” the earliest representatives of
the new subspecies were alleged to have achieved a break-
through without parallel in the history of life, setting them on
the path of discovery and self-knowledge otherwise known
as culture or civilization. Human beings by nature, it was
in the historical endeavor of reaching beyond that nature that
they progressively realized the essence of their humanity. In
their double-barreled, subspecific appellation, the duplicity
that had always been implicit in the concept of the human
was explicitly foregrounded. Referring neither to a species
of nature nor to a condition of being that transcends nature
but to both simultaneously, “human” points to the existential
dilemma of a creature that can know itself and the world of
which it is a part only through the renunciation of its very
being in that world.
The recognition of the human is the product of what
Giorgio Agamben calls an “anthropological machine” that re-
lentlessly drives us apart, in our capacity for self-knowledge,
from the continuum of organic life within which our exis-
tence is encompassed. This machine drives the project of
Western thought and science. Not only does it generate the
problematic of the universal and the particular, of sameness
and difference, but it also ensures that it will never be re-
solved. To escape the impasse—to comprehend knowing as
being, and being as knowing—requires us to dismantle the
machine. The first step is to think of humans in terms not
of what they are but of what they do. With José Ortega
y Gasset, we should say “not that man is, but that he lives”
(Ortega y Gasset 1941:213). Humanity, Ortega tells us, does
not come with the territory, from the mere fact of species
membership or from having been born into a particular cul-
ture or society. It is rather something we have continually
to work at. What we are, or what we can be, does not come
ready made. We have, perpetually and never-endingly, to
be making ourselves. That is what life is, what history is, and
what it means to be human. To inquire into human life is
thus to explore the conditions of possibility in a world peo-
pled by beings whose identities are established, in the first
place, not by received species- or culture-specific attributes
but by relational accomplishment. Unlike the incongruous
hybrids of biology and culture created by the anthropologi-
cal machine, real-world humans build themselves, and one
another, in the crucible of their common life.
HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN CULTURE
Robert Sussman Department of Anthropology, Washington
University, St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130; sussma@artsci.
wustl.edu
Is there something we can call human nature? Of course
there is. Humans generally behave more like each other
than they do like chimpanzees or gorillas. And, chimpanzees
behave more like other chimpanzees than like gorillas or hu-
mans. However, this does not mean that differences among
humans, especially in complex behaviors, can be explained
mainly by genetic variation. In fact, among humans, most
complex behavioral differences, unless specific genes can
be identified for them, must be considered caused by what
anthropology has defined as “culture.”
At the height of the eugenics movement, when most sci-
entists espoused the idea that differences in behavior among
different social classes and “racial” and ethnic groups were
determined by heredity, Franz Boas (1911) developed the
anthropological concept of “culture.” He introduced the
then-radical view that these differences were the product
of different histories, not different innate capacities. These
differences brought about by different life histories, shared
more within than among societies, led to different ways of
dealing with the world and different worldviews. He intro-
duced this novel use of the term culture not as another word
for civilization but in a plural form to express that different
societies exhibit distinctive cultures and that this underlies
major differences among peoples. Unfortunately, anthro-
pologists have forgotten the profound importance of this
concept in understanding human behavior. This is unfortu-
nate because it is perhaps the most important contribution
of anthropology to modern science.
When attempting to ascribe differences among different
individuals or groups to genetically fixed biological capac-
ities, we must be extremely careful, for this implies that
these differences are unchangeable. Historically, this has
been the ammunition used by racists to impose inhumane
treatment on many groups. Cultural, subcultural, and life
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history–induced differences have been misunderstood and
have often formed the basis of prejudices reinforced by
pseudoscience and bad biology. As Boas (1916) asserted,
“Unless the contrary can be proved, we must assume that all
complex activities are socially determined, not hereditary”
(Degler 1991:148). Alfred Kroeber also warned that until
biological bases for behavioral differences are established and
exactly defined, we must assume their nonexistence. If we
do not, our work becomes “a vitiated mixture of history and
biology” (1915:285).
A good example of this is the idea that humans are
by nature aggressive or violent. Yes, we can be violent in
certain contexts, and some people and cultures are more
violent than others. But are these differences “caused” by
environment or heredity? Are different homicide rates in
New York, London, or Tokyo caused by biological differ-
ences in their inhabitants? I think not. To say that humans
have a propensity for violence says nothing. We also have a
propensity for nonviolence. In fact, the norm, or statistically
more common behavior, within human groups is coopera-
tion and among human groups is peace (Fry 2006). Violence,
both within and among societies, is statistically abnormal.
We must understand normal behaviors before we can un-
derstand statistically and behaviorally abnormal ones as well
as the cultural contexts in which the latter occur. To focus
mainly or only on rare, abnormal behaviors is a “5 O’Clock
News” view of human behavior.
So what about human nature? As I said, I do believe
human nature exists. However, for the most part, we have
been studying it at the wrong level. Going back to my
comparison between humans and chimpanzees, these two
species behave differently because of their different natures.
But at what level do these differences in nature occur?
Humans and chimpanzees are different in their neurobi-
ology, and these differences structure the way they behave.
Edmund Leach described how we might approach the study
of underlying structures of behavior:
Quite simple mechanical models can have relevance for social
anthropology despite the acknowledged fact that the detailed em-
pirical facts of social life display the utmost complexity. . . . If
I have a piece of rubber sheet and draw a series of lines on it
to symbolize the functional interconnections of some set of so-
cial phenomena and then start stretching the rubber about, I can
change the manifest shape of my original geometric figure out of
all recognition and yet clearly there is a sense in which it is the
same figure all the time. [1961:7]
In a similar vein, we might say that humans and chimpanzees
are playing different games (chess and checkers but exceed-
ingly more complex). Describing individual behaviors might
not help us understand the ultimate rules of the game. It
would suggest an enormous number of permutations. Once
we knew the rules, however, it might be possible to under-
stand all possible permutations, the totipotentiality of human
or chimpanzee behavior, and the contextual meaning of the
statistical distribution of those permutations. For example,
studying one language would not allow us to understand the
neurobiology or ultimate rules of human language generally,
and chimpanzees don’t have the neurobiology that enables
human language. So far, for most complex behaviors, we are
still just talking about statistical permutations. We need to
start thinking about the underlying rules, the different lines
on our rubber sheets.
CONTROLLED COMPARISON AS A TOOL FOR
DISENTANGLING CONTINGENT HISTORIES
Patrick V. Kirch Departments of Anthropology and Integrative
Biology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-
3710; kirch@berkeley.edu
Anthropologists have long had a powerful tool at their dis-
posal: the method of “controlled comparison.” To this, an-
thropological archaeologists can add the additional advantage
of studying cultural dynamics over the long term. These
two tools—controlled comparison and long-term dynamic
records of cultural change—can help us understand the ways
in which cultures are shaped by external factors including
the environment or are determined by factors intrinsic to
Homo sapiens.
The Pacific Islands and their myriad cultures offer an
especially salient region in which to apply controlled com-
parison in the context of long-term dynamic historical tra-
jectories. Linguistic, archaeological, and bioanthropological
research has established that the peoples and cultures of Re-
mote Oceania (which includes Polynesia, eastern Melanesia,
and most of Micronesia) had a common origin in the Lapita
complex (ca. 1200–500 B.C.E.). The descendants of the
Lapita peoples explored, discovered, and colonized a vast
array of islands, ranging from tropical Fiji to temperate
New Zealand, remote and isolated Easter Island, and sub-
tropical Hawai‘i. The cultures that subsequently developed
on each of these islands all had common origins—hence,
their ancestors shared cultural patterns ranging from kinship
to cosmogony. Yet the Pacific Island cultures documented
in ethnohistoric records and ethnographic fieldwork varied
tremendously. These differences emerged over time as a
result of the contingent, historical interactions among each
human group and its particular environment (and here I must
stress that I mean environment in a “total” sense, including
demographic and social factors).
The space limits of this forum dictate that I limit my-
self to one brief example of how we can use controlled
comparison and historical records in Oceania to understand
human–environment interactions (but see Kirch 2010a for
a longer account). Because “aggression” has long been cen-
tral to debates over human nature, let us look at how in-
stitutionalized aggression (warfare) expressed itself within
Polynesia. To the extent that there are “universal” patterns,
we might hypothesize these to result from intrinsic human
qualities, whereas differences would have to be ascribed to
particular environmental contexts. Historical linguists con-
fidently reconstruct a Proto Polynesian word, ∗toa, which
can be roughly glossed as “warrior.” So a lexically marked
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category of persons skilled in martial arts was already present
2,500 years ago in the Polynesian homeland. But the specific
ways in which aggression and warfare were expressed in
later descendant societies varied remarkably.
On the small and resource-limited island of Mangaia in
the southern Cook Islands, archaeological and paleoecolog-
ical records reveal a historical trajectory of environmental
degradation that led to intense competition and endemic
conflict among social groups, especially for control of lim-
ited irrigation lands. Toa effectively controlled this small
society through terroristic practices that included the taking
and ritual consumption of human victims (this is documented
both ethnohistorically and in the archaeological record). The
political system had evolved away from a classic Polynesian
model based on hereditary succession to a paramountship
of war leaders, each overthrowing the next. Does Mangaian
history validate a Hobbesian view of intrinsic human nature?
In my view no, but it does demonstrate the extent to which
human society is capable of sinking into sheer thuggery and
terror when environmental conditions deteriorate past a
certain threshold.
Now, contrast the role of war and aggression in Mangaia
with that of another Polynesian society, Hawai‘i, in which
resources were not limited. The Hawaiian archipelago, with
16,000 square kilometers, offered a diverse landscape for
both irrigated and dryland agriculture as well as rich marine
resources. Here too, the ancient Polynesian social status of
warrior, koa, played an important role in society. But as
I have argued elsewhere (Kirch 2010b), the late Hawaiian
polities were emergent archaic states, controlled by divine
kings. In Hawai‘i, koa were specialists drawn from the ranks
of the chiefly class. Terrorizing the common people was
not in the interests of the kings or their chiefly supporters,
whose existence depended on a well-ordered and productive
agricultural economy. Aggression was strictly curtailed and
channeled into formalized combat between opposing armies
whose kings sought to expand their territories. Whereas
cannibalism is well documented in Mangaia, Hawai‘i devel-
oped highly ritualized human sacrifice for the dedication of
the kings’ war temples. The two systems—each tracing its
roots back to the same common ancestral origins—could
not have been more different. In short, the nature of war-
fare in any society is not determined by human nature, it is
the outcome of contingent historical interactions between
society and its environment in the broadest sense.
Polynesia is especially well-suited to the use of con-
trolled comparison and the direct historical approach. But
these methods are broadly applicable throughout many other
regions of the world. Through their use, anthropologists can
contribute uniquely to the debate over what it means to be
human.
HUMAN NATURE: ALWAYS CONTEXT DEPENDENT
Elizabeth M. Brumfiel Department of Anthropology, North-
western University, Evanston, IL 60208-1310; ebrumfiel@
northwestern.edu
What is the nature of human nature? Are humans innately
cruel and genocidal? Or are humans by nature cooperative
and altruistic? Clearly, anthropological research across the
globe and through span of human history teaches us that
both genocide and altruism fall within the bounds of human
nature. What is decisive in producing these outcomes is the
context of human action.
If there is one great lesson that anthropology teaches,
it is that human biology, human psychology, and human
behavior are all context dependent. This enormous biologi-
cal and behavioral flexibility—the ability to adopt different
physiological, perceptual, and behavioral repertoires—has
enabled humans to survive across the extremes of climate
and habitat, from the frozen tundra to the burning desert.
Humans are the only biological species to achieve such broad
dispersal. This biological and behavioral flexibility enables
humans to move from foraging camps to industrial cities and
to supplement communication with ancestral spirits with
communication via the Internet at speeds that outstrip the
rate of natural selection, often within the course of a single
lifetime.
Yet this is a lesson that people in the contemporary
United States resist. In the glow that surrounds the suc-
cess of the human-genome mapping project, people in the
contemporary United States seem more determined than
ever to believe that each facet of human biology and human
behavior is hardwired—each trait programmed by a partic-
ular gene. Even the premier scientific journal Science shows a
willingness to reduce the complexities of human biology and
human behavior to elemental and immutable present–absent
oppositions. From high blood pressure to math skills: you
either got it or you ain’t.
In earlier generations, biological determinism served as
a social weapon; it legitimated and naturalized inequality—
in health statistics, income, education, and professional
achievement. Biological determinism justified the lack of
effort to address the social bases of social inequality. In con-
trast, the new biological determinism is sometimes wedded
to proposals to “customize” treatments for different geno-
types. “Personalized” medicine will isolate and treat cancer-
causing genes in individuals. Single-gender classrooms and
schools will address sex-based differences in neurological
and cognitive development. Ironically, such proposals may
well accentuate, rather than eradiate, inequality by (1) de-
voting enormous sums of money to isolating and treating the
individualized genetic components of biological and social
malfunction rather than addressing the already identified en-
vironmental components of these problems and (2) creating,
in some cases, different medical, educational, and other so-
cial “tracks” for individuals falling into different “biologically”
defined groups.
Anthropologists may understand that biology, language,
and behavior are mutually constituting. But I am afraid that
this message is too subtle for public consumption. In ad-
dressing nonanthropologists, I would use cross-cultural and
historical data to argue that human nature is variable in
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its biological, psychological, and behavioral dimensions and
is always context dependent. I would emphasize that, even
within societies, individuals are molded biologically, psycho-
logically, and behaviorally by their experiences. And finally,
I would affirm that broad, flexible social institutions are
needed to encourage all individuals to explore and cultivate
their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses. These
are superior to social institutions that classify individuals into
narrow categories and treat them accordingly, even when
such categories are established by “biological” criteria.
THE HUMAN NATURE OF DISABILITY
Rayna Rapp Department of Anthropology, New York Univer-
sity, New York, NY 10003; rayna.rapp@nyu.edu
Faye Ginsburg Department of Anthropology, New York Uni-
versity, New York, NY 10003; faye.ginsburg@nyu.edu
Anthropology is well-known for its capacious and ever-
expanding framework for understanding “human nature.”
Given the centrality of diversity to our epistemology, why
has the subject of disability not been a central topic for our
discipline? Surely, this form of difference and the social hi-
erarchies that often stigmatize it are a universal aspect of
human life. As we have learned from studies of early and
latter-day eugenics and histories of institutionalization, the
label of “disabled” has been used to dehumanize populations
across the globe. Such knowledge invites anthropological
research on disability, daily life, and governmentality, work
that should be used to “reshape, or at least influence, aca-
demic and public debates” over the human, as the editor of
this inaugural forum suggests.
Unlike the categories of race and gender, from which
one can only enter or exit very rarely and with enormous
and conscious effort—“passing” or “transgendering,” for
example—disability has a distinctive quality: it is a cate-
gory anyone might enter in a heartbeat, challenging lifelong
presumptions of stable identities and normativity. Of course,
some will be more vulnerable than others because of poverty,
war, and the vagaries of health and health care, but no so-
cial category is exempt from disabling experiences, however
they are defined. As a circumstance that requires attention to
subjectivity, cultural meaning, social relations, and the bio-
logical, disability seems a “natural” topic for anthropological
study.
Disability’s continued marginality in our discipline is
curious, given the exceptional quality of groundbreaking
ethnographic studies to date. As anthropologist and disability
scholars Devva Kasnitz and Russell Shuttleworth so tellingly
have analyzed the situation:
Anthropology’s genuine fascination with otherness and the thick-
ness of the ethnographic stance should be a boon to international
disability studies. However, this promise is late in coming. [Kas-
nitz and Shuttleworth 2001:3]
Some reflection on the emergent work on disability in an-
thropology gives us cause for optimism. Space does not
permit a full review of the literature, but early influential
books include: Robert Edgerton’s classic Cloak of Competence
(1993), John Gwaltney’s Drylongso (1993), Nora Groce’s
Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language (1985), and Robert Mur-
phy’s The Body Silent (1990). In 1995, the collection Disability
and Culture, edited by Benedicte Ingstad and Susan Whyte,
brought together comparative work in this emergent area;
by 2007, Ingstad and Whyte’s second collection, Disability
in Local and Global Worlds, brought the perspectives of new
work on human rights, citizenship, and neoeugenics into
conversation with case studies from around the globe.
Recent deeply reflexive ethnographies set in the United
States have gained professional as well as public attention,
such as Gelya Frank’s Venus on Wheels (2000) and Richard
Roy Grinker’s Unstrange Minds (2007). Outside the United
States, studies such as Karen Nakamura’s Deaf in Japan (2006)
and Matthew Kohrman’s Bodies of Difference (on disability in
China; 2005) reveal how a cultural category such as disability
travels into the specificity of local cultural grids.
Like most of these authors, we hope to address both
the discipline and broader audiences in our current research
on cultural innovation and the emergence and social conse-
quences of the category of learning disabilities in the United
States. We are tracking how kinship, caretaking, and the
life course are reconfigured when a child is diagnosed with
a disability. As these families begin to recognize their com-
monalities and needs with others who share their difference,
a new kinship imaginary is emerging, expressed through a
variety of idioms. If social mores once dictated that family
members with disabilities be hidden from view and stories
about them silenced, our research strongly suggests that this
cultural script is being revised on a daily basis, creating a sea
change felt across multiple locations, from the intimacy of
kinship to the public worlds of educational policy, scientific
research, and popular media. And those living in the United
States are not alone: the “public intimacy” now claimed by
members of families and kinship groups with people with
disabilities has become highly visible in other parts of the
globe in recent years.
A year ago, during a discussion of Gail Landsman’s
Reconstructing Motherhood and Disability in the Age of “Perfect”
Babies (2008), our students raised these questions: Why isn’t
disability being taught in every introductory anthropology
class? Why isn’t it part of our graduate training? Clearly, the
significance of disability’s lessons is not lost on the emergent
generation coming into anthropology, perhaps in part be-
cause they grew up in a world in which disability was a fact
of life and no longer hidden. They recognize that disability is
a fundamental anthropological concern as an essential form
of “human nature.” As our students have taught us, it’s time
for our field to accept this challenge.
WHEN DID HOMO SAPIENS PEAK?
Laura Nader Department of Anthropology, University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-3710
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In anthropology our story goes something such as this: human
beings are primates who have evolved. Their evolution is
manifested in increasing brain size and increased intelligence
and symbolic activity.
Later on we find evidence of another creature who was
named Homo sapiens by Linnaeus. In evolutionary terms,
H. sapiens was a life form with fantastic potential: from
creatures with limited ability to modify their environment
to H. sapiens who in a relatively short time had the capacity to
change the environment, to communicate through language,
to populate the globe.
First, apart from noticing the obvious self-adoration, I
was curious as to why humans use the term sapiens to refer to
themselves, and later sapiens sapiens, and whether the sapiens
(intelligent) part is still evolving or de-evolving. So for a
time I went about asking people, “When did homo sapiens
peak?” Three answers will suffice here. The biological an-
thropologist and the ecologist (interview, T. Milleron, 2000)
said, “Just before agriculture was discovered”—some tens
of thousands of years ago—because, prior to agriculture,
humans were ecologically in balance with the planet. With
agriculture began the increasing overutilization of natural
resources, activity that now threatens the globe. A second
answer came from a political scientist who said, “Homo
sapiens peaked with Mozart,” indicating that for him artistic
accomplishment was the most important measure. A third
said that H. sapiens had not yet peaked, indicating that the
species was still evolving, becoming smarter and more in-
telligent with the passage of time.
Several writers have addressed the issue of whether
humans have been getting smarter or whether we’ve been
getting dumber. In the 1930s, the historian, archaeologist,
and philosopher R. G. Collingwood wrote a piece entitled
“Man Goes Mad” (2005), critiquing the notion that men
were getting wiser. Nobel Laureate Albert Szent-Gjorgy, a
biologist who discovered the powers of vitamin C, wrote
The Crazy Ape (1970), a short book about a strange animal:
“In much of the world half the children go to bed hungry
and we spend a trillion on rubbish—steel, iron, tanks. We
are all criminals” (New York Times 1970:43). He doubted
man’s survival in a world run by “idiots,” the New York Times
headlines read (1970:43). In Ishmael (1993), a prize-winning
book by Daniel Quinn, a young man in search of truth finds
himself in an abandoned office with a full-grown gorilla. The
tale is about Takers and Leavers and how we are killing the
Earth along with ourselves.
The present may look quite different through the prism
of the longue durée, offering new insights on what may be too
close to notice (Nader 2008). Historical interpretations en-
ter to challenge or solidify what we know from prehistory.
How would one explain to an anthropologist from Mars
that over the past one hundred years more of nature has
been destroyed than in all prior history? Indeed, how would
we explain “nuclear renaissance” to our ancestors who de-
veloped sophisticated renewable energy sources? Perhaps
H. sapiens is not getting dumber, only getting dumbed.
HUMAN NATURE IN THE AGE OF AVATAR
Conrad P. Kottak Department of Anthropology, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; ckottak@umich.edu
What’s constant? What changes? All anthropologists pon-
der these fundamental questions. What’s human nature;
how do humans vary across cultures? How and why do
cultures change? Is globalization making people more, or
less, alike? To the last question, one might argue either
way. McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, IBM, FIFA, and Nike are
worldwide brands. There is more transnational movement
of people and their products now than ever before. People
everywhere are more familiar with otherness, and in many
settings difference has become a matter for pride and po-
litical mobilization. There may be as much diversity within
contemporary nations as between them.
People living in the United States, for example, are
more diverse ethnically and (arguably) more divided polit-
ically than ever before. The media, intertwined with com-
merce and politics, promotes both unity and diversity. The
centripetal role of an internationally available CNN is bal-
anced by the centrifugal force (within the United States) of
such niche media as Fox News and MSNBC, which promote
political polarization.
Recently I moved from a place where everyone I knew
was a Democrat to a community in which Republicans pre-
dominate and where I regularly encounter views I used to
imagine only in caricature. How, I wonder, can any rea-
sonable person doubt that seven billion people, along with
their animals and machines, have more impact on the en-
vironment than, say, 50,000 hunter-gatherers? How can
people with college degrees believe that humans and di-
nosaurs once walked the Earth together or that the world is
only 6,000 years old? Is politics in the genes? Do Republi-
cans and Democrats literally see, hear, smell, feel, and taste
things differently? Without a doubt, family background and
other cultural forces play a role, but I wonder increasingly
whether the dispositions that underlie political orientation
(e.g., conservatism, flexibility, capacity for outrage or com-
passion) have biological roots.
In social settings here, Republicans and Democrats do
manage to comingle politely. CNN can mediate between
Fox and MSNBC. Reds and blues may be equal fans of the
films Titanic, Star Wars, or Avatar. Even there, however, there
can be strong differences of opinion. Although I’ve yet to
meet anyone who favored the Empire over the rebels in Star
Wars (note that I’ve never met Dick Cheney), I have heard
Avatar faulted for being antibusiness and antimilitary by some
and racist and paternalistic by others.
I happened to see Avatar just as I started planning this
essay. The film is about what it means to be human—and not
human, although still “cultured” in the anthropological sense.
It’s also about conflicting loyalties among humans—to na-
ture, culture, science, enterprise, ethics, morality. It raises
the issue of humanoid rights and of how much one should
support one’s own race—the human—against another.
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Avatar pits capitalist values against local ones—a conflict
that proceeds on Earth as on Pandora. I worry a lot about the
spread of selfishness, the erosion of community and civility,
and the perhaps diminishing ability of local cultures to adapt
to, resist, and survive the powerful forces and threats they
face from outside.
In my work in Brazil (since 1962) and Madagascar (since
1966), I’ve seen the effects of two major causes of change:
population increase and the shift from subsistence to cash.
In Madagascar especially, I’ve witnessed how population
growth fuels agricultural intensification, deforestation, and
rural–urban migration. In both countries, I’ve been struck
by the growing number of young people abandoning tra-
ditional subsistence in favor of seeking jobs for cash, but
work is scarce, fueling migration. They enter the infor-
mal economy—often illegally. In Brazil, men who would
have fished as their grandfathers did instead work locally in
construction or tourism or they migrate. The lure of cash is
strong. I never will forget my first sight of dozens of villagers
in Madagascar destroying an ancestral resource, digging up
a large rice field in search of precious stones, tourmalines,
to sell. This is the most vivid illustration from my own field
experience of the encroachment of cash on a subsistence
economy.
As a general, four-field anthropologist, I still teach Mar-
garet Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Franz Boas so that my stu-
dents know the expression tabula rasa, the empty slate of
human nature on which, the Boasians believed, culture could
write almost any script. What cultural scripts will survive a
hundred years hence? And if there is only one such script,
or just a few, will it or they be based in human nature or
human culture—or, almost surely, in both?
MORE THAN A HUMAN NATURE
Agustı́n Fuentes Department of Anthropology, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556; afuentes@nd.edu
The essays in this forum reflect both diversity and unity of
anthropological thought on human nature. Some open with
recognition of humans’ connection to other primates and
others with a nod to our distinction from ancestral patterns.
Several begin with a focus on cultural change, globally and
locally, while others problematize what we might mean
by, and who we include in, a human nature. We see a
centralization of our species name, Homo sapiens, and even
a note or two on the arrogance in calling ourselves “wise.”
All share a concern with how and where this thing we call
human nature may be leading us.
One can easily describe this forum as challenging the
concept of a single, or simple, “human nature” as an er-
roneous and essentialist philosophy. Jon Marks reminds us
that many seeking to identify our true nature via ancestral
adaptations are practicing a “nothing-but-ism,” that evolu-
tion results in difference and variation, and that, thus, we are
“biocultural ex-apes” rather than upgraded versions of our
ancestors. The power of symbol, expression, self-awareness,
and the presence of human culture permeate these essays,
as does a distinct warning with regard to our hubris and our
tendencies to define ourselves into and out of the world we
share with so many other beings.
The Vital Topics writers focus on human variation and
complexity, a global and local species creating and created
by the world they inhabit. Tim Ingold, invoking Ortega y
Gasset, reminds us that it is not that humans are but, rather,
that they live, create, and become. Robert Sussman cajoles
us not to think about specific behaviors as evidence of our
nature but instead to consider the totipotentiality of permu-
tations in human action. Patrick Kirch demonstrates how
peoples sharing a similar origin can result in radically differ-
ent societies because of the contingent nature of our social
and ecological histories, and Elizabeth Brumfiel emphasizes
our understanding of the mutually constituting synthesis of
biology, language, and behavior. Rayna Rapp and Faye Gins-
burg reinforce these notions of diversity and human action,
inviting anthropology to reshape our conceptualizations to
include disability as a core part of our natural humanity.
We should also consider where living and creating, as
humans, is taking us. Laura Nader chides our taxonomic
arrogance and opines that, because of our actions, we may
be “getting dumbed,” displaced from our self-enshrined pin-
nacle of sapiens. Conrad Kottak invokes Avatar, globalized
corporate brands, and the lure of cash in rural–urban migra-
tions to puzzle out how our diverse and rich social scripts
will read in the not-too-distant future.
So, might these insights reshape, or at least influence,
academic and public debates over the human? The percep-
tion of humans constructing and being constructed by the
world, the centrality of diversity and contingency in be-
coming human, and the warning to seriously consider our
often not-so-sapiens approaches to living and defining our-
selves are central themes here. Consider taking these essays
as jumping-off points to continue our discussions, to refine
them, and to export them. Why not carry these notions,
more frequently and vociferously, to other disciplines, es-
pecially those who have displaced anthropologists as central
interlocutors on the human? Can’t we distinguish ourselves
by raising our voices and bridging the academic–public di-
vide? Maybe. We can start by making sure we do not ignore
our own voices and musings, that we use forums such as this
one on nature and the human as well as our conferences,
classrooms, and the public realm to keep these discussions
alive, visible, and vital.
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